

01025

1962/11/03

November 3, 1962

TO : The Secretary
FROM : IO - Earlan Cleveland
SUBJECT: Points to be Clarified

Here is my understanding of the points on which we were agreed in the meeting held in your office at noon today with Messrs. Ball, Johnson, Martin, and myself.

The points to be clarified with the Russians are adequately covered, in different but equally forceful language, in Mac Bundy's draft memorandum which the President used at the meeting with Governor Stevenson and Mr. McCloy this afternoon.

The UN and OAS points to be clarified are not taken up in the Presidential memo. They are being put into a telegram for dispatch ~~this~~ ~~evening~~ after clearance with the others concerned.

Attachment:

Paper, subject same
as above, (4 pages).

IS FFOICOR 43 Date: 4/3/62

DEPARTMENT OF STATE	CLASSIFY	TS authority to
() RELEASE	() DENY	() S or () C OADR
() EXCISE	() PART	() S or () C OADR
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REVIEWED BY: [Signature] DATE: 4/6/68

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POINTS TO BE CLARIFIED

1. With the Russians

- a. Under the exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev the Soviet Government has undertaken "to reach agreement to enable UN representatives to verify the dismantling of these means". We believe that this commitment has only one meaning: that the Soviets must help in every way to get an international inspection arrangement, including maximum pressure on the Cuban Government to that end. The matter is perfectly simple:
- 1) If we cannot look at the weapons being dismantled and being shipped out, then somebody has to search Cuba to prove that they are not there.
 - 2) If we cannot set up, in agreement with the Soviets and Cubans, and international inspection arrangement for this purpose, the Russians leave us only the alternative of searching the island ourselves.
- b. The United States guarantee not to invade Cuba is contingent on performance by Soviets and their Cuban friends, both in getting UN supervised removal of the weapons and "the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba". Permanent lifting of the quarantine

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is also/...

is also contingent on performance on both of these counts.

The necessary international safeguards can take several forms -- we prefer a UN presence for the verification of the weapons removal, and a Latin American demilitarized zone as the framework for the longer haul. We are flexible about the form in which these things are done. But we are adamant about the fact that the condition precedent to our guarantee and the end of the quarantine is effective international supervision of the process whereby Cuba is denied offensive weapons and is prevented from becoming a Soviet military base.

2. In the United Nations

- a. We do not want to have a Security Council meeting this next week, before there is an indication that the Cubans are prepared to work with some form of UN presence.

We will need a Security Council meeting at the end of Phase Two, to confirm all of the mutual undertakings and receive and accept the report of the Secretary General that he has verified the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

There is a question whether we need a Security Council meeting at any time before the end of Phase Two.

If the Cubans are prepared to cooperate with a UN presence and the Soviets agree, there would be some advantage in strengthening the Secretary General's hand by getting him an explicit Security Council mandate for the establishment of a UN presence in Cuba for the verification operation. But if we are still arguing with the Cubans about this, it would be a mistake to have a Security Council meeting because the Cubans (and perhaps even the Soviets) would merely use it to try to broaden the conversation to include Guantanamo, premature insistence on non-invasion guarantees, arguments about violation of Cuban air space and the like.

- b. There is still a question about the practicability of securing manifests from the Soviets of offensive weapons outbound from Cuba and about the ICRC inspecting these outgoing shipments at sea. The manifests might be phony and it would be necessary to avoid the kind of detailed examination which the Soviets would never permit when it comes to their missiles. This matter needs to be studied urgently by the Defense Department.

3. In the/...

[REDACTED]

3. In the Organization of American States

- a. For the present at least, we do not want any new OAS action on aerial surveillance of Cuba. The surveillance we are now conducting is action taken under the OAS Resolution of October 23. We do not want to call into question the legitimacy of these current actions by asking for more explicit authority to do under OAS auspices what we are already doing under OAS auspices.
- b. It would be useful, prior to the Security Council meeting at which we exchange assurances and commitments, to have an OAS resolution which binds the whole Hemisphere to a non-invasion guarantee but explicitly states the condition (the internationally supervised demilitarization of Cuba in some form) under which the non-invasion guarantee will remain valid. But this will probably not be needed for a couple of weeks or more; the timing of this OAS action should be related to the timing of the eventual Security Council meeting which will symbolize the end of Phase Two.

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DRAFT FOLLOWS

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yes

- 1) If we cannot look at the weapons being dismantled and being shipped out, then somebody has to search Cuba to prove that they are not there.
- 2) If we cannot set up an agreement with the Soviets, agreement with the Soviets and Cubans, and international inspection arrangement for this purpose, the Russians leave us only the alternative of going in and searching the island ourselves.

[illegible]

DEPARTMENT OF STATE / CDC/MR

REVIEWED BY Jm DATE 4-6-87

() SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
() SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
(☒) SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
() SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
FOR MRSA IN THE UNITED STATES (b)(1) ; (b)(5)

_____ REPORTING TO _____

() SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OADR
() DOWNHILL FROM () Sec () C, OADR

- b. The United States guarantee not to invade Cuba is contingent on performance by Soviets and their Cuban friends, both in getting UN-supervised removal of the weapons and "the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba". Permanent lifting of the quarantine is also contingent on performance on both of these counts.

It is therefore not possible either to lift the quarantine or to give a firm non-invasion quarantine until there are permanent arrangements for the demilitarization of Cuba under appropriate international safeguards. This can take several forms -- we prefer a UN presence for the verification of the weapons removal, and a Latin American demilitarized Zone as the framework for the longer haul. ~~But~~ we are flexible about the form in which these things are done. But we are adamant about the fact that international supervision of the demilitarization in Cuba is the condition precedent to our guarantee and the lifting of the quarantine.

2. In the United Nations

- a. We do not want [~~and to have~~] a Security Council Meeting this next week, before there is an indication that the Cubans are prepared to work with some form of UN presence.

We will need a Security Council Meeting at the end of Phase Two, to confirm all of the mutual undertakings and receive and accept the report of the Secretary General that he has verified the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

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2. In the United Nations (continued)

- b. There is still a question about the practicability of securing manifests from the Soviets of offensive weapons outbound from Cuba and ^{ICRC} inspecting these outgoing shipments at sea. The manifests might be phony and it would be necessary to avoid the kind of detailed examination which the Soviets would never permit when it comes to their missiles. This matter needs to be studied urgently by the Defense Department.

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- b. It would be useful, prior to the Security Council Meeting at which we exchange assurances and commitments, to have an OAS resolution which binds the whole Hemisphere to a non-invasion guarantee/^{but} ~~my~~ explicitly states the condition (the international^{ly} supervising^{ed} demilitarization of Cuba in some form) under which the non-invasion guarantee will remain valid. But this will probably not be needed for a couple of weeks or more; the timing of this OAS action should be related to the timing of the eventual Security Council Meeting which will symbolize the end of Phase Two